The Russian World and its (un)holy war: A threat to Christian Unity
In my reflections I examine the ideological and theological foundations of the concept of the “Russian world” (Russkiy mir) in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and argue that this ideology represents a form of pseudo-messianism that distorts Christian teaching, legitimises violence, and undermines the unity of the global Church. Particular attention is given to the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in shaping and promoting this narrative. Also, I explore the implications of this ideology for ecumenical relations and the requirements for a theologically grounded response rooted in truth, moral clarity, and solidarity with the victims of war.
Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine raises increasingly significant questions concerning the responsibility of religious leaders in the aggressor state, the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian state, and the ways in which contemporary understandings of Russian Orthodox theology and ecclesiology may need to be reassessed. It also raises broader questions about the possibilities, limitations, and necessary conditions for dialogue among Christian churches and religious traditions.
War frequently acquires a religious dimension. Religious language can contribute to the legitimisation of violence by providing theological or moral frameworks through which the taking of human life, the claims to ultimate authority, the violation of established norms, and even war crimes may be presented as serving a higher transcendent purpose. In the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine, this religious dimension has become particularly explicit in the emergence of the concept of a “holy war” within segments of Russian religious and political discourse.
This development is clearly reflected in the document The Present and Future of the Russian World, adopted by the XXV World Russian People’s Council. The document explicitly interprets the war in Ukraine in religious and eschatological terms, stating: “From a spiritual and moral point of view, the special military operation is a Holy War, in which Russia and its people, defending the unified spiritual space of the Holy Rus’, fulfills the mission of the "Holder", protecting the world from the onslaught of globalism and the victory of the West that has fallen into Satanism.” [1].
This formulation is significant because it places the war within a broader theological narrative. Military action is not presented merely as a geopolitical or security measure but as part of a larger spiritual struggle in which Russia is assigned a distinctive religious and historical role. Such a framework has important implications for understanding how violence can be morally legitimised and how political objectives can acquire religious significance.
The relationship between religious ideology and military occupation can also be examined through the treatment of religious and educational institutions in territories occupied by Russia. Among the reported consequences of the occupation have been the removal or destruction of Ukrainian-language and Western-oriented Christian literature, the disruption of Christian educational institutions, restrictions on independent religious activity, and pressure on pastors, missionaries, and chaplains. These developments have been particularly significant for institutions with which I have had personal connections, including Donetsk Christian University in 2014 and TavriskiChristian Institute in 2022. Donetsk Christian University was seized and subsequently repurposed as a military base. The university’s library was looted, with a substantial portion of its collection destroyed. Similarly, the campus of Tavriski Christian Institute was seized, looted, and ultimately destroyed, resulting in the complete loss of its library. I recommend reading Valentyn Syniy’s book Serving God Under Siege, or, at a minimum, Rick Ostrander’s review [2] which examines the tragedy and subsequent transformation of Tavriski Christian Institute (TCI).
Such cases suggest that the conflict cannot be adequately understood solely in terms of territorial control. The occupation has also involved attempts to reshape the religious, cultural, and educational environment of affected communities. Christian institutions, literature, schools, libraries, and mission centres can become contested spaces because they embody alternative theological, cultural, and social orientations.
From this perspective, the religious dimension of the war is not merely rhetorical. Religious concepts and institutions have become part of the broader struggle over identity, historical memory, cultural orientation, and political legitimacy. The theological language used to interpret the war therefore deserves careful scholarly examination, particularly with regard to the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy, the ideology of the “Russian World,” and the political objectives of the Russian state.
Without taking this religious dimension into account, it is difficult to fully explain the moral and ideological frameworks through which the conflict has been presented to Russian society and, more broadly, to the international Christian community.
How Did This “Holy War” Become Possible?
Hence the question of the beginning of the war and its moral and spiritual justification: how did all this become possible? It is my firm conviction that this holy war of the “Russian world” became possible due to the active role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in using Christian tradition to revise history, sanction violence, and mobilise its flock.
I find it particularly significant and noteworthy how directly and unequivocally representatives of the global Orthodox community have raised the question of the responsibility of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. “In the wake of Vladimir Putin’s unconscionable and horrendously destructive invasion of Ukraine, Orthodox Christians across the globe must face a difficult question: how can a nation whose majority embraces Orthodox Christianity possibly justify attacking and killing the people of a sibling nation, who almost all share the same faith?”. [3, 270].
Their answer is even more significant and challenging as it calls into question some of our traditional assumptions about religion, interreligious dialogue, Christian unity, and the pursuit of peace among different religious traditions. “The painful truth, but one that we need to confront in this time of repentance, is that our own leadership, and specifically, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, has developed and promoted a false teaching known as “Russkii Mir” or “Russian World,” providing Mr. Putin with the religious “blank cheque” that underwrites his heinous invasion and annexation of Russia’s peaceful, democratic neighbors: Ukraine. Orthodox Christians throughout the world need to declare in no uncertain terms that the “Russian World” ideology is both false and destructive, feeding violence and bloodshed, causing scandal and division in the Church.” [3, 270].
What is the “Russian World”? It is a vague mythological construct. Here I would like to present the idea of the “Russian world” as a challenge to the unity of the Church. The fact is that this idea is, in its essence, a messianic idea—naturally false, deceptive, but nevertheless messianic, or if you will, pseudo-messianic. It begins with presenting Russian Orthodoxy as the last hope of Christianity and the whole world, and the background for this idea is not historical but meta-historical and eschatological. At one time, this chiliastic heresy of Russian pseudo-spirituality was well analysed by Russian religious philosophers such as Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdyaev. The difference is that they saw in it the origins of Russian communism. They could not have foreseen how these distorted pseudo-theological ideas, together with Soviet legacy, would influence the evolution of official Russian Orthodoxy after communism.
Dr. Yaroslav Skira, Professor of Historical Theology at Regis College, characterises the “Russian world” (Russkii mir) as a quasi-religious ideology complicit in genocide in Ukraine. As he explains, “The “Russian world” civilizational mythology holds that there exists a grand Russian civilization based on a “spiritual unity” between Belarussians, Ukrainians, and Russians, all holding the same Orthodox faith and language (i.e., the Russian). That “Russian world” is a society of “traditional values” and is cast in opposition to a perceived decadent West.” [4].
The heresy of the “Russian world” lies in its exaltation over other churches and in its mockery of the very idea of Christian unity. The “Russian world” wants to possess the whole world, not just a part of it. The ROC wants to be independent and dominant, not part of global Christianity, but the last and only bastion of Christianity. Russia recognises no international order—it is its own order. In a similar way, the ROC and the ideology of the “Russian world” it sanctifies, do not recognise subordination, accountability, or locality. It aims to judge and rule over the world, nations, and churches.
They pose the question radically, as Dostoevsky did: “Am I a trembling creature or do I have the right?” And further: “Should the world collapse, or should I not drink my tea? I say the world may collapse.” And here is how it sounds from Putin: “Why do we need such a world if Russia is not in it?” And: “We will go to heaven as martyrs, and they will simply die.” Here the logic of nihilism and the national tradition of crude arrogance are framed in religious rhetoric and, moreover, take on the character of messianic claims.
Political scientist Alicja Curanović understands messianism as a “set of ideas that assume that the history of humankind is heading towards the realisation of a certain Ideal in accordance with Providence’s plan. In this plan, the ‘chosen one’ (individual or collective) has a special role to play (mission). There are three distinctive but interconnected features of ‘mission’: (1) the conviction that one has a special destiny; (2) a sense of moral superiority; and (3) the conviction that the state’s activity is motivated not only by its own national interest but also by a higher cause important for a broader (regional, global, etc.) community.” [5].
Theologians may discern in these claims something more than merely geopolitical ambitions. Russian claims to a messianic role in history—claims to a universal scale and eschatological significance of one’s historical mission (the Third Rome), the alliance of politics and religion to establish a new world order (the statisation of the Church and the sacralisation of state power as an eschaton), and the willingness to justify violent means to achieve holy ends (a holy war).
Those who know the biblical texts well can see in these religious-political statements signs of something far more terrifying. These claims are characteristic of the Antichrist. For the Antichrist and his anti-Christianity are nothing other than the violent implementation of the “kingdom of God” by one’s own power, by the power of a chosen people for the “salvation” of all humanity.
I remember a conversation with my former colleague, Ukrainian by passport and Russian by self-identification. In the spring of 2014, he began coming to the office with a weapon. When I said I did not recognise him and was surprised by his new image, he replied:“Yes, you don’t know me at all yet. I will not allow Ukrainians to take my land.” I responded that it would be better for him to go to Russia and build his “Russian world” there, to which he growled: “The Russian world is everywhere, and I will build it right here.”
Another example is my father. He was Russian by origin, Ukrainian by self-identification. He died of a heart attack after evacuation from Myrnohrad, a mining town where I spent my childhood. The name of this town means “city of peace,” a Ukrainian Jerusalem. For him, Ukraine was associated with freedom and the “Russian world” with prison, with demonic influence, with an explosive mixture of state-controlled Orthodoxy and Stalinism, imperialism, and Russian messianism. He knew about prison firsthand: in Soviet times, he was sentenced to five years in prison for his faith in Christ. So, he recognised the “red demons” (“Soviet evil spirits”) well, no matter what clothes they wore or what masks they used to hide their true face. He died reading the Bible; his hands clutched his beloved book as the last stronghold of truth in this terrible world. The Antichrist changes masks, but those who know the Bible and are guided by the Holy Spirit can always discern his spirit and signature. This is what my father taught me.
Such different examples, such different people. But both were right in their assessments of the “Russian world.” It wants to be everywhere it can. It wants to be universal and messianic. And it won’t tolerate independent Ukraine and its independent Church.
These claims are also connected with the notion of Russian Orthodoxy as a special type of spirituality. Here even repression against the Church finds justification as purification and sanctification. And conformism and servility before state powerare presented as unity with the people and the tsar, as an act of “symphony.”
This is reinforced by accusations against the “decaying West” and corrupt Western Christianity. Only “Holy Rus” can save the West and whole world. It is not going stop in Ukraine, it will “liberate” all of Europe and America.
What can be opposed to the false messianism of the “Russian world” and the ROC? Christian unity in the diversity of traditions and living connections with global Christianity. Christian universalism of freedom and love. Christian solidarity with the victims of war. Christian determination in condemning the heresy of the “Russian world.” Christian faithfulness to the One Church—universal, apostolic, Christ’s.
How About Christian Unity and Dialogue as a Path Toward Reconciliation?
Here I would like to make two important clarifications about unity.
First. I do not believe that official ecumenical structures can help us in this. Unity is not achieved in the WCC. Rather, it comes through the dialogue of educated people, clergy, and laity who know one another as true Christians—in pain and solidarity, in dialogue and love for truth.
I had an interesting exchange on this subject with one of the members of the council of the Keston Institute, Revd Dr Keith Clements (a British Baptist minister with significant ecumenical involvement, including serving as General Secretary of the Conference of European Churches (CEC) from 1997 to 2005), who has devoted considerable effort to encouraging international ecumenical bodies to take the situation in Ukraine more seriously, especially the role of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his article “Dialogue or Confession,” he raises the question of a profoundly serious reassessment of relations with the Russian Orthodox Church for the sake of renewing Christian unity on a more reliable foundation of honesty and integrity, rather than convenience and expediency: “While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been overwhelmingly condemned by the churches of the world, the support of the Russian Orthodox Church for the war poses difficult questions to the ecumenical community: in particular, whether that church’s support for the war and the extreme nationalist policies of President Putin constitute grounds for suspending it from the World Council of Churches (WCC) and other ecumenical bodies. The current ecumenical emphasis upon ‘dialogue’ acts as a deterrent to such action, but the WCC describes itself as a fellowship of churches that confess Christ as God and Saviour and therefore supreme over all other authorities. There are parallels with previous challenges in ecumenical history, most particularly 1930s Germany and the stand of the Confessing Church. While dialogue has its own importance the prime ecumenical commitment in conflict situations is to confess Christ, whatever the risks of division that this incurs” [6, 246].
On March 8, 2022, he wrote an open letter to Patriarch Kirill: “I appeal to you for a word which acknowledges and addresses this situation in terms befitting a great Church of Jesus Christ. Thus far, we in the world outside have words about the desire for peace, but not about the things that make for peace: first of all an acknowledgment of the wrong that is being committed againstthe people of Ukraine, without which no genuine movement towards peace can begin. We are aware of the constraints which Your Holiness experiences, as leader of a Church with such close ties to the Russian state. ‘But the word of God is not chained’ (2 Timothy 2:9) and history shows us that there are moments when the Church is challenged to confess, perhaps at great cost but greatly strengthening its witness to the love of God for all people, where its truest and highest allegiance lies. Christians are called to place above all claims by earthly powers their loyalty to Jesus Christ to whom alone, “all authority in heaven and on earth has been given “(Matthew 28:18)” [7].
Alas, as you might guess, the conversation with the patriarch never took place.
The second clarification is no less important. If we agree that true Christian unity requires much more than the exchange of delegations and agreement on doctrinal formulations, then we should take another step and recognise that we will need something more than the ability to talk. Unity is achieved neither by compromises of church diplomacy nor by well-established communication processes. The foundations of unity among people of one faith, as well as among people of goodwill, lie not in universal communication but in the objective reality of good and evil and in the spiritual-moral choice that each person makes based on this distinction.
The responsibility of Christian churches for ending the war in Ukraine presupposes going beyond both official ecumenical diplomacy with the political Orthodoxy of the ROC and fruitless communication with those who bless genocide.
The responsibility of the churches to make peace in Ukraine possible must be expressed in the reinterpretation of sacred texts according to a hermeneutics of peace rather than war; in new practices of Christian unity in solidarity with victims and the anathematising of murderers, and in interchurch work on the theological and moral evaluation of the teachings and crimes of the “Russian world.”
War in Ukraine as a Challenge to Western Christianity
The war in Ukraine represents a profound test for the global Christian family and, more specifically, for Western Christianity which has traditionally affirmed the values of truth and justice, freedom and human dignity. Its response to the war reveals not only its understanding of the conflict but also much about the moral and theological condition of Western Christianity itself.
This is why a Catholic theologian George Weigel encourages his Church to “put its efforts into rallying international Christian leaders to condemn the heretical claim that Russia is engaged in a “holy war”, to condemn the genocidal claim that Ukraine is simply “Little Russia” and not a nation with its own cultural and political identity, and to denounce the blasphemous claim that the “Russian World” has a unique, messianic mission in the twenty-first century.” [8]
Why has Western Christianity made so little progress in fully recognising the religious dimension of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—including the ways in which the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has contributed to its theological and moral legitimation?
One possible explanation is that Western Christianity has its own vulnerabilities and internal “illnesses” that can make such recognition difficult. This question, however, requires some caution. “Western Christianity” is a broad and necessarily generalised category. Interestingly, this very generalisationreflects, in part, the way the ROC itself constructs its understanding of Western Christianity—as a relatively unified cultural and religious entity opposed to the Russian Orthodox tradition.
Even if Western Christianity does not perceive itself as a unified religious or cultural entity, the Russian Orthodox Church nevertheless tends to construct it as such. From the perspective of the ROC’s discourse, the diverse Christian traditions of the West are often brought together into a single conceptual category— “Western Christianity”—and contrasted with Russian Orthodoxy and the “Russian World.”
As a result, particular crises, failures, or pathologies within specific communities or regions can be projected onto the whole body of Western Christianity, which is then portrayed as decaying or morally corrupted. In an information-driven society, such generalisations can be particularly effective because exceptional cases and controversial incidents tend to receive disproportionate media attention. As a result, isolated or marginal phenomena may come to represent an entire religious tradition, reinforcing an already established narrative of the moral and spiritual decline of the West.
Nevertheless, these pathologies are not merely the product of external misrepresentation; genuine problems do exist within Western Christianity. How these problems are acknowledged, addressed, and, where necessary, corrected can significantly influence both the internal health of Western Christianity and the way it is perceived more broadly.
Obviously, Western Christianity is not in the best shape. Christian nationalism in the United States and Europe is as heretical as the Orthodox “Russian world”; and the desperate desire of American evangelicals to be close to power at any cost is no less questionable than the ROC’s cooperation with the state. The desire to preserve one’s privileged position in society, ties with the state, and familiar church structures can easily outweigh faithfulness to Christ.
If Western churches support and bless the propagandistic slogan “Make Us Great Again” as a programme of national revival, then how are they different from the “Russian world,” which is “rising from its knees” rather than kneeling? Both programmes are far from corresponding to the biblical promises of national renewal: “if my people who are called by my name humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven and will forgive their sin and heal their land” (2 Chronicles 7:14).
Thus, here it is not so much necessary to argue with the apostles of the “Russian world” and criticise their ideas, but to demonstrate the ability of Western Christianity to condemn its own heresies. From this self-critical and penitential act, the spiritual renewal of Western Christianity and interchurch Christian unity may begin.
Thus, the heresy of the “Russian world” and its “holy war” against Ukraine remain an unresolved challenge to Christian unity, which has been called into question by its inability to unitedly condemn the ROC for its active role in the ongoing genocide and its equally glaring unwillingness to decisively support Ukraine and its churches in resisting aggression. This challenge carries within it the possibility both of renewing Christian unity and of further fragmentation of global Christianity.
Rev. Dr. Mykhailo Cherenkov, Theology Department Chair, Tavriski Christian Institute, Kyiv, Ukraine
References
1. Order of the XXV World Russian People's Council "Present and Future of the Russian World" // RISU. Religious Information Service of Ukraine, April 03, 2024. https://risu.ua/en/order-of-the-xxv-world-russian-peoples-council-present-and-future-of-the-russian-world_n147334?utm_source=chatgpt.com#goog_rewarded
2. Rick Ostrander. A Ukrainian Seminary’s Resilience. Russian troops destroyed its buildings but not its mission // Christianity Today, Nov/Dec 2025 Issue. https://www.christianitytoday.com/2025/11/ukrainian-seminarys-resilience/
3. Brandon Gallaher and Pantelis Kalaitzidis. A Declaration on the “Russian World” (RusskiiMir) Teaching // Mission Studies 39 (2022), pp. 269-276.
4. Yaroslav Skira. Patriarch Kirill, the “Russian World” Myth, and Genocide // Public Orthodoxy, March 15, 2022. https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/03/15/patriarch-kirill-russian-world-genocide/
5. Alicja Curanović. 'Russian messianism is a counter-hegemonic narrative of Russia as an underdog'. // Centre for East European and International Studies, 16.12.21, https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/meet-the-author/russian-messianism-is-a-counter-hegemonic-narrative-of-russia-as-an-underdog
6. Keith Clements. Dialogue or Confession. Ecumenical Responsibility and the War in Ukraine // Journal of Anglican Studies, Volume 21, Issue 2. November 2023, pp. 246-259.
7. An open letter to His Holiness, Patriarch Kirill, Moscow. From Baptist minister the Revd Dr Keith Clements, former General Secretary of the Conference of European Churches. March 8, 2022 //https://www.baptist.org.uk/Articles/631495/An_open_letter.aspx
8. George Weigel. When Ideology and Blasphemy Meet // Ethics & Public Policy Center, April 10, 2024. https://eppc.org/publication/when-ideology-and-blasphemy-meet/